"Is Wealth Becoming More Polarized in the United States?" by Conchita D'Ambrosio & Edward N. Wolff
Is Wealth Becoming More Polarized
in the United States?
Conchita D’Ambrosio¤and Edward N. Wol¤y
This version May 2001
Abstract
Recent work has documented a rising degree of wealth inequality
in the United States between 1983 and 1998. In this paper, we look
at another dimension of the distribution, polarization. Using tech-
niques developed by Esteban and Ray (1994) and further extended
by D’Ambrosio (2001), we examine whether a similar pattern exists
with regard to trends in wealth polarization over this period. The
approach here followed provides a decomposition method, based on
counterfactual distributions, which allows one to monitor what factors
modi…ed the entire distribution and where precisely on the distribu-
tion these factors had an e¤ect. An index of polarization is provided
as well as summary statistics of the observed movements and of dis-
tance and divergence among the estimated and the counterfactual dis-
tributions. The decomposition method is applied to US data on the
distribution of wealth between 1983 and 1998. We …nd that polar-
ization between homeowners and tenants, as well as among di¤erent
educational groups, continuously increased from 1983 to 1998, while
polarization by income classes groups continuously decreased. In con-
trast, polarization by racial group …rst increased from 1983 to 1989
and then declined from 1989 to 1998, while polarization by age groups
followed the opposite pattern. We also …nd that most of the observed
variation in the overall wealth density over the 1983-98 period can be
attributed to changes of the within-group wealth densities rather than
to changes in household characteristics over the period.
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11 Introduction
Recent work has documented a rising degree of wealth and income inequal-
ity in the United States during the 1980s and the 1990s. Regarding the
distribution of income, some have reported that the increasing dispersion
was due to the shrinkage of the middle class. In particular, Burkhauser et
al. (1999) report that the e¤ect of the business cycle during the 1980s was
such that while economic growth bene…ted all groups, the gains were not
evenly distributed and the great majority of the vanishing middle class be-
came richer. In contrast, Blank and Card (1993) report an increase in the
mass in the lower tail of the distribution with increasing poverty rates.
The aim of our paper is to investigate changes in the entire distribu-
tion of wealth and, at the same time, to look at another dimension of the
distribution, polarization. Using techniques developed by Esteban and Ray
(1994) and further extended by D’Ambrosio (2001), we examine whether
rising wealth inequality is mirrored in an increase in polarization over the
two decades.
Polarization refers to the formation of clusters around local poles. The
distribution of wealth of the entire population is …rst decomposed into the
distribution of wealth for di¤erent homogeneous groups within the popula-
tion. We then examine the following issues: (1) Are the groups di¤erent so
to actually constitute poles with regard to wealth levels? (2) How great are
these di¤erences? (3) How persistent are these di¤erences over time? (4)
What are the causes of the observed changes? The emergence of clusters in
a distribution has political relevance, since it may lead to political con‡ict
within a society (see, for example, Esteban and Ray, 1999).
The concept of polarization is used to compare the homogeneity of a
group with the overall heterogeneity of a population. If the distribution of
a variable such as wealth is very compressed within groups within a popu-
lation (such as the racial groups of blacks and whites) but very diverse be-
tween groups, then we consider wealth “polarized” between the the groups.
Polarization is fundamentally di¤erent from inequality and thus cannot be
measured by a Lorenz consistent index. Suppose, for example, that the
distribution of household wealth within a country is uniform over wealth
levels 0 to 1000. Now imagine a transformation that causes the wealth of
all the households with wealth between 0 and 500 to converge to 250, and
the wealth of all the households in the interval 500 and 1000 to converge to
750. Any Lorenz consistent inequality measure will register an unambigu-
ous decline of inequality from this transformation. However, clustering has
nevertheless increased. This society loses its middle class and polarizes to
the two-point distribution at 250 and at 750.
Similarly, polarization cannot be additively decomposed into within- and
between-group components using classical techniques. A new decomposition
method is applied here. The method provides an index that can be used
2both to calculate the distance between social groups classi…ed according to
household characteristics and to track changes over time. The new method
also reveals the factors that are reshaping the wealth distribution and allows
us to identify precisely where these e¤ects are having their greatest impact.
We examine polarization patterns and their change over time with regard
to a number of household dimensions. The …rst is between home owners and
renters; the second is by race and ethnicity, between non-Hispanic whites
versus other groups; the third is by age class; the fourth is by family type -
married couples, single males, and single females; the …fth is by household
income class; and the last is by educational class. The polarization indices
are computed for total household wealth. We also look at polarization pat-
terns for stock ownership.
The estimates of the wealth distribution and of its evolution through
time, for the whole population and for its subgroups, are obtained by ap-
plying the kernel density estimation method. The same method is used to
estimate counterfactual densities, i.e. what the density of wealth would have
been in one year if household characteristics (between-group component) or
the distribution of wealth among households with the same characteristics
(within-group component) had remained at the level of the previous year.
We …nd that wealth polarization followed di¤erent patterns depending on
the household dimension. In particular, polarization between homeowners
and tenants, as well as between di¤erent educational groups, continuously
increased from 1983 to 1998, while polarization by income classes groups con-
tinuously decreased. In contrast, polarization by racial group …rst increased
from 1983 to 1989 and then declined from 1989 to 1998, while polarization
by age groups followed the opposite pattern.
The main …nding of the decomposition method used to explain the ob-
served changes in the wealth distribution is that changes in household char-
acteristics did not have a large in‡uence on the evolution of the wealth
density during the period under examination. Instead, most of the observed
variation in the overall wealth schedule can be attributed to the (dramatic)
changes of the within-group wealth densities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next two sections (Sec-
tions 2 and 3) introduce the method used to estimate the wealth densities
and the indices used to summarize the observed movements in the densities
of wealth. Section 4 contains a description of the data sources. The appli-
cation of the method to US data on household wealth is treated in Section
5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 The estimation method
The estimated distributions are derived from a generalization of the ker-
nel density estimator to take into account the sample weights attached to
3each observation. The estimate of the density function, b f (y), is determined
directly from the data of the sample, y1, y2, ..., yN, without assuming its
functional form a priori. The only assumption made is that there exists a
density function f (y) from which the sample is extracted. In detail:










where N is the number of observations of the sample, hN is the bandwidth
parameter, K (:) is the kernel function1. The sample weights are normalized
to sum to one,
P
i µi = 1:
The counterfactual densities are obtained by applying the kernel method
to appropriate samples. This technique has been derived from the one pro-
posed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996).
Each observation is actually a vector (y;z j ty;tz), composed of wealth
y, a vector z of household characteristics and a date t at which respectively
wealth and characteristics are observed, belonging to a joint distribution
F (y;z j ty;tz). The marginal density of wealth at one point in time, ft (y);
can be obtained by integrating the density of wealth conditional on a set of
household characteristics and on a date t, f (y j z;ty;tz), over the distribu-
tion of household characteristics F (z j ty;tz) at the date t:
ft (y) =
R
z2-z dF (y;z j ty = t;tz = t)
=
R
z2-z f (y j z;ty = t;tz = t)dF (z j ty = t;tz = t)
´ f (y j ty = t;tz = t)
(2)
where -z is the domain of de…nition of household characteristics.
If all the variables are observed at two di¤erent times, e.g. t1 and t2,
then two counterfactual densities can be obtained form (2): the counter-
factual density of wealth at t1 and characteristics at t2, represented by
f (y j ty = t1;tz = t2):
f (y j ty = t1;tz = t2)
=
R
z2-z dF (y;z j ty = t1;tz = t2)
=
R
z2-z f (y j z;ty = t1;tz = t2)dF (z j ty = t1;tz = t2)
(3)
and analogously the counterfactual density of wealth at t2 and characteristics
at t1.
Under the assumption that the structure of wealth conditional on the
distribution of household characteristics does not depend on the time of the
household characteristics:
f (y j z;ty = t1;tz = t2) = f (y j z;ty = t1;tz = t1) (4)
1In this paper the kernel function used is the triangular and the bandwidth parameter
is chosen in order to match the sample value of the Gini coe¢cient.
4and under the assumption that the distribution of household characteristics
conditional on the time of the characteristics does not depend on the date
when wealth is observed:
F (z j tz = t2;ty = t1) = F (z j tz = t2;ty = t2) (5)
then the counterfactual density of wealth at t1 and characteristics at t2 is:
f (y j ty = t1;tz = t2) =
R
z2-z f (y j z;ty = t1)dF (z j tz = t2) (6)
This counterfactual density indicates the density that would have prevailed
if household characteristics had remained at their t2 level and if the house-
hold wealth distribution had been the one observed in t1 for households
with those characteristics. General equilibrium e¤ects are, indeed, excluded
from the analysis, as the e¤ects of changes in the distribution of z on the
structure of wealth are not taken into account. What we estimate is the
e¤ect of movements between groups on the total density of wealth under
the assumption that the distributions within each group do not change over
time.
Assuming instead that:
f (y j z;ty = t2;tz = t1) = f (y j z;ty = t2;tz = t2)
F (z j tz = t1;ty = t1) = F (z j tz = t1;ty = t2)
(7)
the counterfactual density of wealth at t2 and characteristics at t1 is:
f (y j ty = t2;tz = t1) =
R
z2-z f (y j z;ty = t2)dF (z j tz = t1) (8)
This counterfactual density focuses on the within-group component of
the observed movements by estimating the e¤ect of changes in the distribu-
tion of wealth among households with the same characteristic on the dis-
tribution of wealth for the whole population, assuming that the household
characteristics do not change over time.
The di¤erence between the actual and the counterfactual density rep-
resents the e¤ects, on the one hand, of changes in the distribution of the
characteristics of the households (between-group component) and, on the
other, of changes in the wealth structure of households with given char-
acteristics (within-group component). In particular, for simplicity, we can
rewrite equation (2) with z as a discrete random variable:
ft(y) =
R








z (y) = F (z j ty = t;tz = t), the proportion of household in each
group, and ft
z (y) = f (y j z;ty = t;tz = t), the density of wealth within each
group. The total density of wealth, ft (y), can change over time both because
5there is a movement of households between groups, i.e. the value of ¼t
z (y)’s
changes, and because the structure of wealth within each group changes, i.e.
the value of ft
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It is clear from equations (6) and (8) that the counterfactual densities
can be obtained by estimating2 the component densities non-parametrically:
² f (y j z;ty = ti) is estimated by applying the kernel method to the
appropriate sample in year ti;
² F (z j tz = ti) is estimated non parametrically as proportion of house-
holds with given characteristics in year ti.
3 Summary indices
To summarize the observed movements we use two kind of indices. First, an
index to take into account the changes in the density of a given group over
time, the coe¢cients of distance, i.e. an index that summarizes how much
any two given densities di¤er. Second, an index to take into account the ex-
isting “distance” between given groups in which a society can be partitioned
at one point in time, the polarization index, i.e. an index that tracks the
moving apart of some densities classi…ed according to some characteristic of
the household.
Several coe¢cients have been suggested in the statistical literature for
measuring distances between probability distributions.3 In this work we use










2An alternative estimation method for the counterfactual density of income at t1 and
characteristics at t2 is proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996).
3For a detailed survey see, among others, Ali and Silvey (1966).





jf2 (y) ¡ f1(y)jdy (12)
The Kolmogorov measures of distance and of variation distance are measures
of the lack of overlapping between groups. In particular, regarding the latter,
Kov = 0 if the densities coincide for all values of y, it reaches the maximum,
Kov = 1, if the densities do not overlap. The distance is sensitive to changes
of the distributions only when both take positive values, being insensitive to
changes whenever one of them is zero. It will not change if the distributions
move apart, provided either that there is no overlapping between them or
that the overlapping part remains unchanged.
For the second type of index, the index of polarization4, we use that sug-
gested by Esteban and Ray (1994) as well as a modi…cation that D’Ambrosio
(2001) proposed.
The intuition behind the polarization index is the following. Let’s take
agents i and j that own di¤erent levels of wealth in the society that we
are analyzing. i feels di¤erent from j, actually he is alienated from j, and
from all the j’s that exist in the society: S (i) =
Pn
j=1jyi ¡ yjj¼j rep-
resents the separation that i feels from j, where yi is the wealth owned
by agent i and ¼i is the relative frequency of group i. The e¤ective sep-
aration, however, depends on how many agents similar to i are in the
society. E (i) = S (i)¼®
i is the e¤ective separation and ® is the impor-
tance that we give to this phenomenon. Polarization in the society is the
sum, over all the agents, of the e¤ective separation that they are feeling:
P =
Pn





i jyi ¡ yjj¼j.5
Esteban and Ray introduce a model of individual attitudes in a society
to formalize the above intuitions and use some axioms to narrow down the
set of allowable measures. In particular, Esteban and Ray suppose that each
individual is subject to two forces: on the one hand, he identi…es with those
he considers to be members of his own group, I : R+ ! R+ represents
the identi…cation function; and on the other hand, he feels alienated from
those he considers to be members of other groups, a : R+ ! R+ is the
alienation function. An individual with wealth yi feels alienated to a degree
of a(±(yi;yj)) from an individual with wealth yj. ±(yi;yj) is a measure of
distance between the two wealth levels. For Esteban and Ray this is simply
the absolute distance jyi ¡ yjj. The joint e¤ect of the two forces is given
4Wolfson’s measure of polarization (1994) does not apply as it is a measure of bipolar-
ization and we are here interested in monitoring the movements of the distributions of all
numbers of groups.
5A similar interpretation can be given to the Gini coe¢cient but in Gini it does not
matter how many agents are there similar to the one under analysis, in other words
in the Gini coe¢cient the separation and the e¤ective separation coincide. Hence the
proportionality between P and Gini (Gini de…ned over the logs) when ® = 0.
7by the e¤ective antagonism function, T (I;a); and total polarization in the







i ´jT (I (´i);a(±(yi;yj))) (13)
where ´i represents the population share associated with yi. The measure














i ´j jyi ¡ yjj (14)
for some constants K > 0, ® 2 [1;1:6] that indicates the degree of sensitivity
to polarization.








¯ ¯¹i ¡ ¹j
¯ ¯ (15)
¼i and ¹i represent respectively the relative frequency6 and the conditional









In other words, what is computed empirically is the degree of polarization in
a society, where it is assumed that everybody in each given group possesses
a wealth equal to the mean of the group.7
Following D’Ambrosio (2001), we can use the proposed a modi…cation8
6The population weights ´i, i = 1;:::;N are replaced by the population frequencies.





7The Esteban and Ray index involves some previous grouping since it assumes that
the society is partitioned into a small number of signi…cantly sized groups, and groups
of insigni…cant size (e.g., isolated individuals) carry little weight (Esteban and Ray 1994,
page 824).
8Esteban, Gradin and Ray (1998) have already proposed a modi…cation of ER (P)
to correct for not having included in the analysis the inequality within each group and
the overlapping of the groups that has the e¤ect of overestimating the level of observed
polarization. In particular:
P(®;¯) = ER(®)¡¯" (17)
where:
" = G(f) ¡ G(¹) (18)
the di¤erence between the Gini coe¢cient computed on the ungrouped, G(f), and grouped
data, G(¹). ¯ is the parameter that indicates the importance given to the approximation
error.
8of ER to compute the level of polarization within a given society without
assuming that everybody in each group has a wealth equal to the mean,
and at the same time we can consider a characteristic, other than wealth, to
generate the group partition, e.g. race, age, education. Wealth polarization
is hence thought to be linked to speci…c characteristics of the population.
The idea behind the modi…cation is a direct application of the method pre-
viously described. The total density of wealth, ft (y), at any point in time,
is given by the sum of the densities of each group, weighted by the relative
frequency of each group:
ft (y) =
R
z2-z dF (y;z j ty;z = t)
=
R
z2-z f (y j z;ty = t)dF (z j tz = t)
(19)
The polarization index has to register the moving apart of the densities
classi…ed according to some characteristics of the household that forms the
groups and di¤erences in the frequencies between the groups. Each individ-
ual identi…es with those of his own group and feels alienated from those he
considers to be members of other groups, as Esteban and Ray noted, but
now the groups are identi…ed by these other characteristics and not by lev-
els of wealth. The index of polarization that Esteban and Ray proposed is
modi…ed in order to take into account the distance between the distributions
of wealth of each group. The measure of distance between two distributions
suggested is the Kolmogorov measure of variation distance and the following








PK(®) ranges between 0 and
¡1
2
¢1+®. The maximum is achieved when there
are only two groups of the same size with no overlapping. The index can be
normalized to take values between [0;1] by multiplying it by 21+®.
4 Data sources
The data sources used for this study are the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, and
1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) conducted by the Federal Reserve
Board. Each survey consists of a core representative sample combined with
a high-income supplement. The supplement is drawn from the Internal Rev-
enue Service’s Statistics of Income data …le. For the 1983 SCF, for example,
an income cut-o¤ of $100,000 of adjusted gross income is used as the crite-
rion for inclusion in the supplemental sample. Individuals were randomly
selected for the sample within pre-designated income strata. The advantage
of the high-income supplement is that it provides a much “richer” sample of
high income and therefore potentially very wealthy families. However, the
9presence of a high-income supplement creates some complications, because
weights must be constructed to meld the high-income supplement with the
core sample9.
The SCF also supplies alternative sets of weights. For the 1983 SCF,
we have used the so-called “Full Sample 1983 Composite Weights” because
this set of weights provides the closest correspondence between the national
balance sheet totals derived from the sample and the those in the Federal
Reserve Board Flow of Funds. For the same reason, results for the 1989 SCF
are based on the average of SRC-Design-S1 series (X40131 in the database
itself) and the SRC Designed Based weights (X40125); and results for the
1992, 1995, and 1998 SCF rely on the Designed-Base Weights (X42000) – a
partially design-based weight constructed on the basis of original selection
probabilities and frame information and adjusted for nonresponse10. In the
case of the 1992 SCF, this set of weights produced major anomalies in the size
distribution of income for 1991. As a result, the weights have been modi…ed
somewhat to conform to the size distribution of income as reported in the
Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (see Wol¤, 1996, for details
on the adjustments).
The Federal Reserve Board imputes information for missing items in the
SCF. However, despite this procedure, there still remain discrepancies for
several assets between the total balance sheet value computed from the sur-
vey sample and the Flow of Funds data. Consequently, the results presented
below are based on Wol¤’s adjustments to the original asset and liability
values in the surveys. This takes the form of the alignment of asset and
liability totals from the survey data to the corresponding national balance
sheet totals. In most cases, this entails a proportional adjustment of re-
ported values of balance sheet items in the survey data (see Wol¤, 1987,
9Three studies conducted by the Federal Reserve Board – Kennickell and Woodburn
(1992) for the 1989 SCF; Kennickell, McManus, and Woodburn (1996) for the 1992 SCF;
and Kennickell and Woodburn (1999) for the 1995 SCF – discuss some of the issues
involved in developing these weights.
10The 1998 weights are actually partially Designed-Based weights (X42001), which ac-
count for the systematic deviation from the CPS estimates of homeownership rates by
racial and ethnic groups.
101994, 1996, and 1998 for details)11.
The principal wealth concept used here is marketable wealth (or net
worth), which is de…ned as the current value of all marketable or fungible
assets less the current value of debts. Net worth is thus the di¤erence in value
between total assets and total liabilities or debt. Total assets are de…ned
as the sum of: (1) the gross value of owner-occupied housing; (2) other real
estate owned by the household; (3) cash and demand deposits; (4) time
and savings deposits, certi…cates of deposit, and money market accounts;
(5) government bonds, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and other …nancial
securities; (6) the cash surrender value of life insurance plans; (7) the cash
surrender value of pension plans, including IRAs, Keogh, and 401(k) plans;
(8) corporate stock and mutual funds; (9) net equity in unincorporated
businesses; and (10) equity in trust funds. Total liabilities are the sum of:
(1) mortgage debt, (2) consumer debt, including auto loans, and (3) other
debt.
This measure re‡ects wealth as a store of value and therefore a source of
potential consumption. We believe that this is the concept that best re‡ects
the level of well-being associated with a family’s holdings. Thus, only assets
that can be readily converted to cash (that is, “fungible” ones) are included.
As a result, consumer durables such as automobiles, televisions, furniture,
household appliances, and the like, are excluded here, since these items are
not easily marketed or their resale value typically far understates the value
of their consumption services to the household. Also excluded is the value
of future social security bene…ts the family may receive upon retirement
(usually referred to as “social security wealth”), as well as the value of
retirement bene…ts from private pension plans (“pension wealth”). Even
though these funds are a source of future income to families, they are not
in their direct control and cannot be marketed12.
11The adjustment factors by asset type and year are as follows:
1983 SCF 1989 SCF 1992 SCF 1995 SCF
Checking Accounts 1.68
Savings and Time Deposits 1.50
All Deposits 1.37 1.32
Financial Securities 1.20
Stocks and Mutual Funds 1.06
Trusts 1.66 1.41 1.45
Stocks and bonds 1.23
Non-Mortgage Debt 1.16
No adjustments were made to other asset and debt components.
It should be noted that the alignment has very little e¤ect on the measurement of wealth
inequality – both the Gini coe¢cient and the quantile shares. However, it is important
to make these adjustments when comparing changes in mean wealth both overall and by
asset type.
12See Burkhauser and Weathers (2000) for recent estimates of social security and pension
wealth.
115 The results
Several studies have already analyzed the US distribution of wealth. The
importance of monitoring its evolution through time and tracking where
di¤erent groups of the population are located on the wealth scale is well
recognized (Wol¤, 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999).
The calculations, drawn from Wol¤ (2000) and contained in Table 1
show that wealth inequality, after rising steeply between 1983 and 1989,
increased at a slower pace from 1989 to 1998. The share of wealth held
by the top 1 percent rose by 3.6 percentage points from 1983 to 1989 and
the Gini coe¢cient (a measure of overall inequality) increased from 0.80 to
0.83. Between 1989 and 1998, the share of the top percentile grew by a more
moderate 0.7 percentage points but the share of the next 9 percentiles fell
by 0.4 percentage points and that of the bottom two quintiles grew by 0.9
percentage points, so that overall, the Gini coe¢cient fell from 0.83 to 0.82.
The Addendum to Table 1 shows the absolute changes in wealth between
1983 and 1998. The results are even more striking. Over this period, the
largest gains in relative terms were made by the wealthiest households. The
top one percent saw their average wealth (in 1998 dollars) rise by 3.0 million
dollars or by 42 percent. The remaining part of the top quintile, as well as
the second quintile, experienced increases from 21 to 24 percent. While the
middle quintile gained 10 percent, the poorest 40 percent lost 76 percent!
By 1998, their average wealth had fallen to $1,100.
The reason for additional research on this topic is to investigate in detail
the increasing dispersion in the aggregate distribution of wealth observed
from 1983 to 1989 and from 1989 to 1998. In particular, we look at another
dimension of the distribution, polarization. We examine whether a pattern
similar to what has been observed regarding inequality exists for trends
in wealth polarization over this period. The questions we are addressing
are the following: Are the distributions of wealth of di¤erent racial, age,
family type, income class, educational groups behaving in the same way over
time? Have the densities of these groups the same shape and, if not, are the
di¤erences increasing or decreasing over time? Our aim is, furthermore, to
understand what determined the changes observed at the aggregate level. In
particular, we want to determine if the increasing dispersion of the aggregate
distribution is due to changes in household characteristics or to changes in
12the distribution of wealth within households with the same characteristics.
Figure 1: The distribution of household wealth. 1983-1998.
We examine polarization patterns and their change over time with regard
to a number of household dimensions:
1. home owner status (home owners and renters);
2. race (non-Hispanic whites versus other groups);
3. age (head of the household is under 45 years old, between 45 and 69,
older than 70);
4. family type (married couples, single males, single females);
5. income class (household income is under $25,000, between $25,000 and
$74,999, over $75,000);
6. education (head of the household has under 16 years of education, 16
or above years of education).
7. stock and mutuals owner status (household does own stock and mu-
tuals or does not).
The distribution of household wealth is characterized by a continuous
increase in the dispersion over the years of analysis even if at a decreasing
13pace, as shown in Figure 1 where the estimated densities and the di¤erences
among them are plotted. In particular, the movement of mass from the
center of the distribution towards the tails is dramatic for the period 1983 -
1989 and not so sharp for the years 1989 - 1998.
By looking at the groups in which the total population can be parti-
tioned according to household characteristics, we notice that wealth is not
distributed in the same way at the same point in time nor the changes
registered over time are common among di¤erent groups (Figures 2 to 5).
Household wealth by homeowner status, racial/ethnic group, educational
group, and stock ownership was distributed very di¤erently between the
groups in all the years analyzed. In particular, the wealth density of renters,
blacks and Hispanics, family heads with less than a college degree, and
households not owning stock lay to the left (toward lower levels of wealth)
compared to home owners, non-Hispanic whites, family heads with a college
degree, and stock owners, respectively. The di¤erences rose over time be-
tween home owners and renters, between college graduates and non-college
graduates, and between stock owners and non-owners due to an increased
mass of the wealth density at high levels of wealth for home owners, college
graduates, and stock owners, respectively. The polarization indices par-
tially con…rm these observations (Tables 2 and 3). In particular the EK
index shows a continuous increase over time by home owner, education, and
stock ownership status. On the other hand, according to the ER index
polarization by educational and stock ownership status increased over time,
while polarization by home ownership status declined from 1983 to 1989 and
increased from 1989 to 1998 since this index captures only the di¤erences in
the means and not changes in the whole distributions.
Regarding racial groups (Figure 2), the di¤erence in wealth densities …rst
increased and then decreased. Between 1983 and 1989 the wealth owned by
non-Hispanic whites increased, causing more density to shift toward higher
wealth levels, while the wealth density of non-Hispanic whites shifted upward
during the 1989-1998 period. Polarization according to the EK index (Table
3) increased from 1983 to 1989 and then declined from 1989 to 1998, while
according to the ER index polarization (Table 2) increased continuously
over the three years.
The di¤erences in the wealth ownership by age group (Figure 3) …rst
declined, between 1983 and 1989, and then increased between 1989 and
1998 as a consequence of shifts in the wealth density of the oldest age group.
The density of the oldest age group shifted toward that of the middle age
group between 1983 and 1989, causing a decline in the level of polarization.
Between 1989 and 1998, the wealth density of the oldest age group shifted
away from that of the youngest, resulting in a rise in polarization.
With regard to family type, the results on polarization are sensitive to
the index used. The modi…ed Esteban and Ray index, PK, primarily shows
an increase in polarization between households. From Figure 3, we can see
14that this result is due to the fact that the wealth densities of single male and
single female households almost overlap while the wealth density of married
couples has put increasing distance between itself and the other two family
type groups over time.
The wealth densities by income group show a close correspondence be-
tween income levels and wealth. The distances among the income groups
decreased over time, as did the EK and ER polarization indices.
To determine if the ‡attening of the aggregate wealth distribution over
time is due to changes in household characteristics or to changes in the
distribution of wealth within households with the same characteristics we
use the decomposition method described above. The results are shown in
Figures 6 to 11. In the left hand side of the …gures are plotted the distances
among the estimated density of the …rst year and the counterfactual densities
of the second year obtained by using the estimated densities of each group of
the second year and the relative frequencies of the …rst year (between-group
decomposition). In the right hand side of the …gures are plotted the distances
among the estimated density of the …rst year and the counterfactual densities
of the second year obtained by using the estimated densities of each group of
the …rst year and the relative frequencies of the second year (within-group
decomposition). The main …nding of the decomposition method is that
changes in household characteristics did not have a large in‡uence on the
evolution of the US wealth density between 1983 and 1998. Instead, most
of the observed variation can be attributed to shifts in the within-group
wealth schedules, which underwent dramatic changes. During the 1983 -
1989 period, within-group shifts of the wealth densities by home ownership
status, age, family type, race and educational groups account for most of the
change in the overall wealth density over the period. During the 1989 - 1998
period, the same results are found by race, age and family income group.
These results are con…rmed by the measures of divergence and distance
reported from Tables 4 to 10: decreasing values for all the within-group
components in both periods except by income classes and stock ownership.
6 Conclusions
This paper has used a method that focuses on changes in the entire wealth
distribution of the United States over the period from 1983 to 1998. We …nd,
…rst, on the basis of the decomposition analysis, that changes in household
characteristics had a minimal e¤ect on the evolution of the overall wealth
density between 1983 and 1998. Instead, most of the observed variation over
time is attributable to shifts in within-group wealth schedules.
We …nd, second, that polarization between homeowners and tenants in-
creased continuously over the period from 1983 to 1998. This …nding is
somewhat consistent with the results reported in Table 11, which show that
15the ratio of median wealth between tenants and home owners declined con-
tinuously over the three years. However, the ratio of mean wealth between
the two groups …rst rose between 1983 and 1989 and then declined from 1989
to 1998. By 1998, the gap in mean wealth between homeowners and tenants
was greater than in 1983. The increasing wealth polarization between home-
owners and renters also appears to be consistent with previous studies which
have emphasized the importance of home ownership as a vehicle for wealth
accumulation in general (see, for example, Oliver and Shapiro, 1997). Be-
sides providing forced savings (through the amortization of mortgage debt),
owning a home may also access to greater …nancial information and create
a psychological disposition toward saving for the future.
Second, polarization between college graduates and non-graduates also
increased continuously over the 1983-1998 period. The pattern is somewhat
di¤erent than that reported in Table 11. Between 1983 and 1989, the ratio
of mean net worth between the two groups rose from 3.85 to 4.12 but then
declined to 3.87 in 1998. Likewise, the ratio of median wealth between the
two groups, after rising from 3.26 in 1983 to 4.09 in 1989 fell o¤ to 3.58
in 1998. The …nding of enhanced wealth polarization between the college
educated and less educated groups is consistent with numerous studies of
the labor market which have found a rising return to a college education
over the period in question (see, for example, Levy and Murnane, 1992).
Third, polarization by income classes groups continuously decreased over
the same period. This …nding re‡ects, in part, the fact that the relative
wealth position of the top income class, both in terms of means and medians,
declined over the period from 1983 to 1998 (see Table 11). However, the
relative wealth holdings of the lowest income class also deteriorated over
these years.
Fourth polarization by racial group …rst increased from 1983 to 1989 and
then declined from 1989 to 1998 It is also trued that the ratio of median
wealth between non-whites and non-Hispanic whites …rst declined from 0.09
in 1983 to 0.05 in 1989 and then rose to 0.12 in 1998. However, the ratio of
mean wealth between the two racial groups actually increased from 0.24 in
1983 to 0.31 in 1989 before falling o¤ a bit to 0.29 in 1998. The decreased
racial polarization of the 1990s may partly re‡ect the rise of a black (and
Hispanic) middle class in the United States (see, for example, Oliver and
Shapiro, 1997).
Fifth, polarization by age groups declined from 1983 to 1989 and then
rebounded in the 1990s. This pattern may re‡ect the fact that the average
wealth of the poorest age group, those households headed by a person under
45 years of age, relative to the overall mean …rst rose from 1983 to 1989
and then declined in 1998. However, the median wealth of the under 45 age
group relative to the overall median declined continuously over the three
years.
Sixth, the time trends in polarization by family type were sensitive to the
16index used. The results of Table 11 show that the relative wealth position of
households headed by an unmarried female deteriorated over the period from
1983 to 1998 while the relative net worth position of single males improved.
Female-headed households consist of both divorced and widowed women and
those never married. The relative decline in the wealth of female-headed
households as a group probably re‡ects the dramatic rise in the number of
never married women with children.
Seventh, polarization between households that own and those that do
not own stock or mutual funds, after changing very little between 1983 and
1989, skyrocketed in the 1990s. This pattern is also re‡ected in Table 11.
The ratio of mean wealth between stock owners and those who do not hold
stock fell somewhat from 5.7 in 1983 to 5.5 in 1989 and then climbed to
6.2 in 1998, while the ratio of median net worth rose continuously, from
5.6 in 1983 to 6.6 in 1989 and then to 9.1 in 1998. These results re‡ect,
in part, the rapid rise of stock prices during the 1990s. However, it may
also be attributable to greater access among stock owners to other …nancial
instruments and …nancing possibilities.
On a …nal note, it is apparent that the polarization indices are a much
more complex measure of group homogeneity relative to population-wide
heterogeneity than a simple comparisons of group means and medians would
suggest. Though trends in relative means and median generally parallel
trends in the polarization indices, there are several incidences where the two
set are at variance.
               Percentage Share of Wealth Held by
               ----------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------
            Gini   Top    Next    Next    Next     Top      2nd      3rd      Bottom
Year   Coeff  1.0%   4.0%   5.0%   10.0%  20.0%  20.0%  20.0%  40.0%   All
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1983    0.80   33.8    22.3    12.1    13.1      81.3       12.6    5.2        0.9     100.0
1989    0.83   37.4    21.6    11.6    13.0      83.5       12.3    4.8       -0.7     100.0
1992    0.82   37.2    22.8    11.8    12.0      83.8       11.5    4.4        0.4     100.0
1995    0.83   38.5    21.8    11.5    12.1      83.9       11.4    4.5        0.2     100.0
1998    0.82   38.1    21.3    11.5    12.5      83.4       11.9    4.5        0.2     100.0
Addendum:  Mean Values by Quantile (in Thousands, 1998 Dollars):
1983              7.175  1,187   516.2  278.7   864.5     133.6   55.5    4.7      212.6
1998            10.204  1.441   623.5  344.9 1126.7     161.3   61.0    1.1      270.3
% Change     42.2    21.4       20.8     23.7    30.3       20.7   10.0    -76.3   27.1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1: The size distribution of net worth. 1983-1998.
17ER alfa=1 alfa=1.3 alfa=1.6
homeownership (1983) 0.2505 0.2064 0.1710
homeownership (1989) 0.2321 0.1909 0.1580
homeownership (1998) 0.2510 0.2081 0.1741
race (1983) 0.1667 0.1460 0.1306
race (1989) 0.1861 0.1587 0.1377
race (1998) 0.1943 0.1676 0.1474
age (1983) 0.2176 0.1689 0.1318
age (1989) 0.1765 0.1363 0.1058
age (1998) 0.1814 0.1387 0.1066
family type (1983) 0.1514 0.1225 0.1002
family type (1989) 0.1605 0.1242 0.0974
family type (1998) 0.1440 0.1140 0.0915
income class (1983) 0.3030 0.2439 0.1998
income class (1989) 0.2872 0.2191 0.1700
income class (1998) 0.2814 0.2048 0.1511
education (1983) 0.2474 0.2144 0.1897
education (1989) 0.2610 0.2285 0.2043
education (1998) 0.2784 0.2348 0.2008
stock and mutuals (1983) 0.3255 0.2828 0.2509
stock and mutuals (1989) 0.3250 0.2835 0.2525
stock and mutuals (1998) 0.3670 0.3091 0.2638
Table 2: Esteban and Ray polarization index among the distributions of
1983, 1989 and 1998.
18EK alfa=1 alfa=1.3 alfa=1.6
homeownership (1983) 0.1570 0.1592 0.1625
homeownership (1989) 0.1620 0.1640 0.1671
homeownership (1998) 0.1636 0.1670 0.1719
race (1983) 0.0639 0.0689 0.0759
race (1989) 0.0849 0.0892 0.0953
race (1998) 0.0741 0.0787 0.0852
age (1983) 0.1036 0.0991 0.0952
age (1989) 0.0922 0.0876 0.0838
age (1998) 0.1022 0.0961 0.0908
family type (1983) 0.0749 0.0745 0.0749
family type (1989) 0.0835 0.0794 0.0766
family type (1998) 0.0825 0.0805 0.0796
income class (1983) 0.1536 0.1532 0.1546
income class (1989) 0.1552 0.1480 0.1427
income class (1998) 0.1411 0.1280 0.1174
education (1983) 0.0869 0.0928 0.1010
education (1989) 0.1088 0.1172 0.1291
education (1998) 0.1233 0.1281 0.1349
stock and mutuals (1983) 0.1418 0.1514 0.1649
stock and mutuals (1989) 0.1504 0.1621 0.1784
stock and mutuals (1998) 0.1886 0.1959 0.2063
Table 3: Esteban and Ray modi…ed polarization index (normalized) among
































Table 4: Summary indices computed between the actual distribution of 1983































Table 5: Summary indices computed between the actual distribution of 1983































Table 6: Summary indices computed between the actual distribution of 1983
































Table 7: Summary indices computed between the actual distribution of 1983
































Table 8: Summary indices computed between the actual distribution of 1983































Table 9: Summary indices computed between the actual distribution of 1983
































Table 10: Summary indices computed between the actual distribution of 1983
and the stock and mutuals counterfactuals distribution of 1989.
Mean Net Worth Median Net Worth
Group 1983 1989 1998 1983 1989 1998
A. Home owner status
Home owner 1.47 1.43 1.44 1.96 2.09 1.96
Renter 0.18 0.27 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.00
B. Race
Non-Hispanic whites 1.17 1.21 1.19 1.29 1.44 1.35
Other races 0.29 0.37 0.35 0.12 0.07 0.17
C. Age
Under 45 0.40 0.49 0.45 0.38 0.33 0.26
Ages 45-69 1.73 1.58 1.56 1.92 1.86 1.75
Age 70 and over 1.21 1.32 1.30 1.51 1.89 2.08
D. Family type
Married couples 1.34 1.42 1.34 1.46 1.70 1.51
Single males 0.34 0.63 0.67 0.15 0.56 0.35
Single females 0.50 0.29 0.44 0.45 0.36 0.42
E. Income Class [1998$]
Less than $25,000 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.12 0.13
$25,000-$74.999 0.65 0.65 0.60 1.26 1.29 1.20
$75,000 or more 4.79 4.15 3.91 5.50 5.55 5.19
F. Education
Less then College grad. 0.62 0.63 0.55 0.76 0.78 0.68
College graduate 2.40 2.58 2.14 2.49 3.20 2.43
G. Stock ownership
Owns stocks or mutual funds 2.89 2.90 2.49 3.57 4.11 3.85
Non-owner 0.51 0.53 0.40 0.64 0.62 0.42
Table 11: Ratio of mean to median net worth to the overall mean by household characteristic.
22Figure 2: The distribution of household wealth by homeownership status and racial groups.
Figure 3: The distribution of household wealth by age and family type groups.
23Figure 4: The distribution of household wealth by income class and educational groups.
Figure 5: The distribution of household wealth by stock ownership groups.
24Figure 6: Distance among the 1983 estimated density and 1989 countefactual densities
obtained applying the between- and within-group decomposition.
25Figure 7: Distance among the 1983 estimated density and 1989 countefactual densities
obtained applying the between- and within-group decomposition.
Figure 8: Distance among the 1983 estimated density and 1989 countefactual densities
obtained applying the between- and within-group decomposition.
26Figure 9: Distance among the 1989 estimated density and 1998 countefactual densities
obtained applying the between- and within-group decomposition.
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